

## Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SANA 1604

E.O. 11652: GDS  
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SUBJECT: OPPOSITION GROUPS IN YEMEN

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BEGIN SUMMARY. AGAINST BACKGROUND OF PERVASIVE OPPORTUNISM  
THREE MAJOR ANTI-HAMDI POLITICAL GROUPLINGS CAN BE ROUGHLY  
DELINEATED AT THE PRESENT TIME AS OPERATING WITHIN YEMEN, I.E.  
THE TRIBAL AND TRADITIONAL RIGHT, THE URBAN AND PROGRESSIVE  
LEFT AND THE OPPORTUNISTISTS PAR EXCELLENCE. AS LONG AS THE  
REGIME HOLDS TOGETHER THESE GROUPS DO NOT PRESENT A MAJOR  
THREAT AT THIS TIME. THE NORTHERN TRIBES, HOWEVER, COULD  
FIELD SUFFICIENT NUMBERS OF ARMED MEN TO CAUSE SERIOUS  
TROUBLE FOR THE REGIME, PARTICULARLY IF SUCH A CONFRONTATION  
WERE COORDINATED WITH LEFTIST SABOTAGE IN THE SOUTH. THE LONG  
TERM DANGER IS THAT CURRENT POLITICAL TROUBLES  
WILL PLAY INTO HANDS OF EXTREMIST LEFT.  
DESPITE A TENDENCY TO BE ALL THINGS TO ALL PEOPLE AND  
REPORTS OF REGIME CORRUPTION, AL-AHMDI REMAINS THE BEST  
VEHICLE FOR MODERATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN YEMEN AND THEREBY  
CONTINUES TO WARRANT US AND SAUDI SUPPORT. END SUMMARY.

1. MODERN (AND PERHAPS ANCIENT AS WELL) YEMENI POLITICS HAVE  
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BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY CONSTANTLY SHIFTING PERSONAL ALLIANCES  
MOTIVATED AS MUCH BY SELF-INTEREST AND OPPORTUNISM AS BY  
HIGHER IDEALS OF PATRIOTISM OR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY. ONE  
MIGHT SAY THAT POLITICS OR IDEOLOGY FOR MANY YEMENIS IS  
AN EMPTY PURSE TO BE CARRIED TO ANYONE WILLING TO FILL IT  
THIS PHENOMENON HAS CHARACTERIZED BOTH THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT  
IN YEMEN AND THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IS NO DIFFERENT.

IN FACT THE CURRENT POLITICAL MANEUVERINGS AND MACHINATIONS ONLY SERVE TO DRAMATIZE THIS FACT. FOR, IN MOST CASES WHAT WE SEE IN YEMEN TODAY IS A GROUP OF "OUTS" UNITED IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE "INS" NOT BY COMMON IDEALS OR IDEOLOGY BUT BY AN OPPORTUNISTIC DESIRE TO TAKE POWER. OPPORTUNISM AND VENALITY, THEREFORE, MOTIVATE MANY ON THE LEFT AS ON THE RIGHT. HAVING SAID THAT, HOWEVER, IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT UNLIKE THE RIGHT, THERE ARE ON THE LEFT COMMITTED AND DISCIPLINED IDEOLOGUES, ALBEIT A SMALL NUMBER. THESE ELEMENTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE, AS IN PDRY, OF THE LACK OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE RIGHT AND THE MIDDLE AND THEREBY TO BE FURTHER ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR AN EVENTUAL LEFTIST TAKE-OVER.

2. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND OF PERVASIVE OPPORTUNISM, ONE CAN FOR THE SAKE OF THIS DISCUSSION DELINEATE THREE MAJOR OPPOSITION GROUPS TO THE HAMDI REGIME TO BE FOUND WITHIN YEMEN. THEY CAN BE ROUGHLY BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS: THE TRIBAL, TRADITIONAL ZAYDI RIGHT; THE URBAN, PROGRESSIVE, SHAFAI LEFT; AND THE OPPORTUNISTS PAR EXCELLENCE.

3. ON THE TRIBAL AND TRADITIONAL RIGHT OF THE SPECTRUM THERE ARE TWO DISTINCT FACTIONS. THE FIRST AND BY FAR THE MORE IMPORTANT IS COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF NORTHERN ZAYDI TRIBAL SHAIKHS LED BY ABDALLAH BIN HUSSAYN AL-AHMAR, PARAMOUNT SHAIKH OF THE HASHID CONFEDERATION. SUPPORTING HIM IS HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW, MUJAHID ABU SHUWARIB WHO WAS A MILITARY OFFICER BUT WHO HAS NO INDEPENDENT POWER BASE.

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IT IS DIFFICULT TO TELL HOW MANY OF THE TRIBAL SHAIKHS WOULD ACTUALLY FOLLOW AL-AHMAR INTO OPEN REBELLION BUT HIS PRESTIGE IS STILL SUFFICIENTLY HIGH AMONG THE NORTHERN TRIBES TO ENABLE HIM TO MOUNT A CREDIBLE THREAT TO THE REGIME. APART FROM A RELIGIOUS "ANTI-COMMUNIST" POSITION IT IS ALSO DIFFICULT TO DISCERN ANY "IDEOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS" TO THE ANTI-REGIME STANCE OF AL-AHMAR. IN FACT, DESPITE THE ISLAMIC ANTI-COMMUNISM OF THE TRIBES, THERE ARE RELIABLE REPORTS OF CONTACTS WITH THE LEFT BY ABU SHUWARIB. MOREOVER, AL-AHMAR HIMSELF AFTER VISITS TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND NORTH KOREA HAS BEEN QUOTED AS PRAISING WHAT HE SAW AND CALLING THE NORTH KOREANS FRIENDS. NONETHELESS, BY AND LARGE AL-AHMAR AND HIS SUPPORTERS SEEM MOTIVATED BY TWO DESIRES: A) TO MAINTAIN ZAYDI DOMINANCE IN THE COUNTRY, AND B) TO CONTINUE TO PRESERVE THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE TRIBAL SHAIHS AS ARBITERS OF POWER AND DISPENSERS OF FACORS.

4. ANOTHER LESS-ORGANIZED AND LESS-KNOWN FACTION ON THE

TRADITIONAL RIGHT CONSISTS OF HASHIMITES OR MEMBERS OF THE FORMER RULING CLASS FO SAYYIDS, THAT IS, DESCENDANTS OF THE PROPHET FROM WHICH IN THE PAST THE IMAMS WERE DRAWN. IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT TO GET ANY RELIABLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THIS GROUP AND IT APPEARS THAT, IN FACT, THE HASHIMITES PRESENT NO REAL THREAT. SOME MEMBERS OF THE HAMDI REGIME SEEM TO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE INDIVIDUALS (AMBASSADOR YAHYA AL-MUTAWAKKIL, AND MINISTER OF SUPPLY ABD AL-MAILK) WITHIN THE HASHIMITE GROUP WHO ARE ACTIVELY AND CURRENTLY WORKING FOR A RESTORATION OF THE POWER OF THE SAYYIDS PRIMARILY BY SEEKING THE SUPPORT OF THE SAUDIS, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS OF HASHIMITE FLIRTATION WITH THE LEFT. REPORTEDLY THIS GROUP, IF SUCCESSFUL, WOULD ESTABLISH AN "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC" AS A WAY OF GUARANTEEING THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE SAYYID CLASS IN ITS FORMER RULING POSITION.

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5. ON THE URBAN AND PROGRESSIVE LEFT THERE ARE THREE MAJOR FACTORS, DRAWN PRIMARILY FROM THE CITIES OF TAIZ AND HODEIDAH AND FROM SHAF AIS IN GENERAL. THE FIRST CONSISTS OF BAATHIS WHO, TODAY, ARE LARGELY SUPPORTED BY THE IRAQIS ALTHOUGH IN THE PAST THERE WAS ALSO SYRIAN SUPPORT. MOST OF THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE FORMER STUDENTS OF BAGHDAD OR DAMASCUS UNIVERSITIES, WHO WERE EXPOSED TO THE BAATHI IDEOLOGY DURING THEIR SCHOOL DAYS. THEIR NUMBERS ARE NOT LARGE BUT MANY OF THEM HOLD KEY MIDDLE-GRADE POSITIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT, THANKS TO THEIR EDUCATION ABROAD. BAATHIS ARE ALSO SAID TO HAVE INFILTRATED THE ARMY IN THE JUNIOR AND MIDDLE RANKS AND TO BE ACTIVE AT SANA UNIVERSITY.

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6. THE SECOND URBAN LEFTIST GROUP CALLS ITSELF NASSERIST. LIKE THE YEMENI BAATHIS MOST OF THESE PERSONS WERE EDUCATED IN CAIRO DURING NASSER'S HEYDAY AND BECAME ENAMORED OF HIS PARTICULAR BRAND OF ARAB NATIONALISM AT THAT TIME. AGAIN, IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET A GOOD IDEA OF THEIR NUMBERS BUT THIS GROUP TOO HAS MANAGED TO INFILTRATE INTO VARIOUS GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES WHERE RECENTLY IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THEY ARE COOPERATING WITH THE BAATHIS, THEIR ERSTWHILE BITTER ENEMIES. THE LIBYANS ARE SAID TO BE SUPPORTING THIS GROUP AND ALSO HAVE RECENTLY REPORTEDLY ENCOURAGED THE NASSERISTS TO WORK WITH THE BAATHIS AS PART OF A JOINT LIBYAN/IRAQI ANTI-SAUDI/ANTI-SADAT EFFORT IN THIS REGIONS.

7. THE THIRD LEFTIST GROUP CONSISTS OF MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF YEMENI REVOLUTIONARY RESISTERS WHO ARE SUPPORTED DIRECTLY BY THE ADENI REGIME. UNTIL RECENTLY THIS GROUP WAS REPORTEDLY COOPERATING WITH THE LOCAL BAATHIS BUT AS A RESULT OF THE STRAINED ADENI-IRAQI RELATIONS THAT COOPERATION IS NOW SAID TO HAVE ENDED. THIS GROUP IS MARXIST IN IDEOLOGY BELIEVING THAT THE UNIFICATION OF YEMEN IS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS EVENTUAL COMMUNIZATION OF THE ENTIRE PENINSULA. SOME OF THEIR MEMBERS ARE TRUE IDEOLOGUES PREPARED TO SACRIFICE EVERYTHING AND DO ANYTHING  
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FOR THE PARTY. MANY OF THE ASSASSINATIONS OF YEMENI POLITICAL FIGURES IN RECENT YEARS HAVE BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO THIS GROUP.

8. THE THIRD MAJOR OPPOSITION GROUP TO AL-HAMDANI CAN SIMPLY BE CALLED THE OPPORTUNISTS PAR EXCELLENCE. LEADING THIS GROUP IS SINAN ABU LUHUM, A MINOR SHAIKH OF THE BAKIL FEDERATION, WHO THROUGH WILINESS AND POLITICAL MACHINATIONS MANAGED TO BUILD FOR HIMSELF AND HIS CLAN AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL POSITION IN YEMEN UNTIL AL-HAMDANI CAME ALONG AND REMOVED THE FAMILY EFFECTIVELY FROM THE LOCAL SCENE. ONE OF ABU LUHUM'S DAUGHTERS IS MARRIED TO FORMER PRIME MINISTER MUHSIN AL-AYNI, WHO DESPITE HIS "PROGRESSIVE" CREDENTIALS MUST ALSO BE LUMPED TOGETHER WITH THE OPPORTUNISTS, GIVEN THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN HIM AND HIS FATHER-IN-LAW IN THE DAYS WHEN AL-AYNI WAS

THE PRIME MINISTER. IT IS RELIABLY REPORTED THAT SINAN ABU LUHUM HAS BEEN IN THE PAY OF PDRY SINCE 1972 WHILE MORE RECENTLY THROUGH AL-AYNI HE HAS ALSO RECEIVED MONIES FROM THE IRAQIS.

9. ON THE FACE OF IT IT WOULD APPEAR THAT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS OPPOSITION GROUPS WOULD BE UNLIKELY, GIVEN THE IDEOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL DIFFERENCES WHICH SEPARATE THEM. YET, AL-HAMDI'S SUCCESS OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS IN REMOVING FROM THE POLITICAL SCENE POLITICAL OPPONENTS FROM BOTH THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT HAS ALSO MADE POSSIBLE AN ALLIANCE OF CONVENIENCE AMONG THESE GROUPS AGAINST HIM. THE LINK WHICH APPARENTLY IS PULLING THE EXTREME RIGHT AND THE EXTREME LEFT TOGETHER AGAINST AL-HAMDI IS BEING PROVIDED NOT SURPRISINGLY BY THE OPPORTUNISTIC ABU LUHUMS. ON THE ONE HAND THROUGH MUHSIN AL-AYNI THE ABU LUHUMS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH CONTACTS WITH NOT ONLY THE LOCAL LEFT (I.E. BAATHIS AND NASSERISTS) BUT ALSO WITH THEIR IRAQI AND LIBYAN PATRONS. ON THE RIGHT, THANKS THE SINAN ABU LUHUM'S  
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STRONG INFLUENCE OVER AL-AHMARA, THE OPPORTUNISTS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH

SOME OF THE NORTHERN SHAIKHS WHO DESPITE THEIR ISLAMIC-INSPIRED ANTI-COMMUNISM HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE ABU LUHUMS AND THE LEFT AGAINST WHAT IS PERCEIVED TO BE A COMMON ENEMY. UNFORTUNATELY AL-AHMAR AND THE SAHIKHS DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE THE BREADTH OF VISION TO SEE THAT THEY ARE BEING USED BY SINAN ABU LUHUM ACTING AS A SURROGATE FOR THEIR TRADITIONAL ENEMY, THE LEFT. (IN THIS REGARD WE HAVE NO REPORTS OF ACTIVE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT AT THE PRESENT TIME IN YEMEN'S POLITICAL IMBROGLIOS BUT DOUBTLESS THEY WOULD WELCOME A CHANCE TO BRING FRIENDLIER ELEMENTS BACK INTO THE LOCAL POLITICAL ARENA.)

10. AS ALREADY MENTIONED, THE NORTHERN TRIBAL SHAIKHS ARE THE ONLY GROUP WHICH CAN POSE A MILITARY PROBLEM FOR THE REGIME AT THE PRESENT TIME. IT IS THIS GROUP WHICH HAS THE POTENTIAL TO FIELD A LARGE NUMBER OF ARMED MEN. HOW LARGE THAT NUMBER IS IS DIFFICULT TO SAY, HOWEVER. WE WOULD ESTIMATE IT TO BE IN THE THOUSANDS. THE OTHER GROUPS, PARTICULARLY THE LEFTISTS, COULD BE COUNTED UPON TO ENGAGE IN SABOTAGE AND TERROR AS THEY HAVE DONE IN THE PAST BUT THEY DO NOT POSSESS THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE SHAIKHS. IF THE TWO SIDES COORDINATED THEIR EFFORTS DOUBTLESS THE HAMDI REGIME WOULD FACE A DIFFICULT INTERNAL SITUATION. DESPITE THIS, UNLESS THE REGIME LOSES ITS INTERNAL COHESION WE BELIEVE THAT THE REGIME COULD SUCCESS-

FULLY WITHSTAND THIS CHALLENGE, ALTHOUGH OPEN ARMED CONFLICT  
WOULD RESULT IN A SERIOUS DRAIN ON THE HAMDI REGIME'S  
RESOURCES AND WOULD REPRESENT A MAJOR SETBACK TO POLITICAL  
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY. IN SUCH A CONFLICT  
THE ARMY BY AND LARGE WOULD REMAIN LOYAL TO AL-HAMDI,  
DESPITE THE FACT THAT MANY OF THE OFFICERS ARE SHAIKHS OR  
SONS OF SAHIKHS. SHOULD AL-HAMDI BE REMOVED, HOWEVER,  
THE ARMY COULD WELL BREAK UP ALONG ZAYDI-SHAFAI LINES,  
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GIVEN THE REPORTED STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN ZAYDI  
LT. CHIEF-OF-STAFF  
COL. AL-GHASHMI AND SHAFAI PARACHUTIST COMMANDER MAJ. ABD AL-ALIM.

1. THUS, THE KEY FIGURE ON THE YEMENI POLITICAL STAGE  
REMAINS IBRAHIM AL-HAMDI, WHO THROUGH CONSUMMATE  
POLITICAL MANEUVERINGS OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS HAS  
MANAGED TO ISOLATE EXTREMIST OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME WHILE  
ACTING AS A RALLYING POINT FOR MODERATES OF BOTH THE RIGHT  
AND THE LEFT AND AS A LINK BETWEEN THE ZAYDI NORTH AND  
THE SHAFAI SOUTH. SHOULD AL-HAMDI BE REMOVED, IT IS  
DIFFICULT TO SEE WHO COULD PLAY THE ROLE HE HAS THUS FAR SO  
SUCCESSFULLY ASSUMED OR ESTABLISH THE PERSONAL RELATION-  
SHIPS IN BOTH HALVES OF THE COUNTRY. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT

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INITIALLY THE YEMENI POLITICAL SYSTEM WOULD BE ABLE TO WORK

OUT A NEW POLITICAL COMPROMISE, AS WAS DONE IN THE EARLY SEVENTIES. FOR EXAMPLE, AL-AHMAR MIGHT AT FIRST BE ABLE TO BECOME THE DOMINANT FIGURE WORKING WITH THE MODERATES, WHILE NO DOUBT ENJOYING FULL SAUDI SUPPORT. NONETHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE FRAGILE COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE MODERATES OF BOTH RIGHT AND LEFT WHICH HAS THUS FAR GUIDED YEMENI POLITICS WOULD SOON BE SEVERELY STRAINED AS THE EXTREMISTS FROM EITHER THE RIGHT OR THE LEFT WOULD TRY TO EDGE OUT THEIR OPPONENTS. MOREOVER, WITH AL-AHMAR AT THE HELM, IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE TRADITIONAL ZAYDI-SHAFAI ANTIPATHIES WOULD AGAIN EMERGE TO BE USED BY THE URBAN AND SOUTHERN LEFT AGAINST THE NORTHERN AND TRIBAL RIGHT. IN A SITUATION LIKE THIS, THE MODERATES AND RELIGIOUS SECTARIANS WOULD SOON BE FORCED TO TAKE SIDES AND THE RESULT COULD WELL BE A POLITICAL BREAKDOWN LEADING ULTIMATELY TO INTERNAL DISORDERS AND CIVIL STRIFE.

12. AL-HAMDI, THEREFORE, REMAINS THE ONLY MAJOR FIGURE AT THE PRESENT TIME ABLE TO KEEP YEMEN'S DELICATE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN BALANCE. COMING AS HE DOES FROM A ZAYDI FATHER AND SHAFAI MOTHER WITH RELIGIOUS AND TRIBAL CONNECTIONS TO THE CONSERVATIVES THROUGH HIS QADI BACKGROUND AND WITH IDEOLOGICAL AND NATIONALIST CONNECTIONS TO THE  
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PROGRESSIVES THROUGH HIS MILITARY EDUCATION, AL-HAMDI IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO LEAD YEMEN ON THE PRAGMATIC PATH WHICH THE YEMENI MODERATES HAVE ALL AGREED IS THE BEST WAY FOR YEMEN. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT AL-HAMDI IS "THE GOODIE" AND ALL THE OTHERS ARE "THE BADDIES." IN SOME RESPECTS HE IS LIKE ALL OTHER YEMENI POLITICAL LEADERS IN CONFOUNDING PERSONAL AND FAMILY INTERESTS WITH THOSE OF THE STATE. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE LONG HEARD STORIES OF PECULATION AND VENALITY BY HIS BROTHERS AND BY CLOSE PERSONAL ADVISORS LIKE MINISTER OF SOCIAL, LABOR & YOUTH AFFAIRS AHMAD DAHMASH. SO FAR HIS OWN PERSONAL REPUTATION REMAINS UNTARNISHED BUT THE STORIES HAVE GOTTEN CLOSER TO HIM OVER THE LAST YEAR. IN ADDITION, AL-HAMDI DOES NOT APPEAR WILLING TO PERMIT THE EMERGENCE WITHIN THE REGIME OF STRONG AND ABLE INDIVIDUALS, PREPARED TO GAINSAY HIM, IF NECESSARY. DOUBTLESS HE FEARS POSSIBLE RIVALS, BUT SUCH A FEAR OR PERHAPS PERSONAL INSECURITY CAN ONLY MAKE THE JOB OF DEVELOPMENT IN YEMEN MORE DIFFICULT AT A TIME WHEN COMPETENT AND EDUCATED YEMENIS ARE AT A PREMIUM. FINALLY, AL-AHMADI HAS THE TALENT (OR THE CUNNING) TO BE ALL THINGS TO ALL PEOPLE. IN A FRAGMENTED AND POLITICALLY PRIMITIVE SOCIETY LIKE YEMEN THIS APPROACH MAY BE THE ONLY PRACTICAL AND ADVISABLE ONE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS THIS SEEMING EQUIVOCATION THAT NO DOUBT AROUSES THE SUSPICIONS OF THE LOCAL CONSERVATIVES AND EVEN MORE IMPORTANT

OF THE SAUDIS. NOTHING WE HAVE SEEN, HOWEVER, WOULD INDICATE THAT AL-HAMDI IS A LEFTIST OR EVEN A LEFTIST SYMPATHIZER. BASICALLY HE IS A MIDDLE-OF-ROAD, PRAGMATIC NATIONALIST WHO WANTS TO DO GOOD FOR HIS COUNTRY WHILE REMAINING IN POWER AS LONG AS HE CAN. HE HAS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR YEMEN TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH SAUDI ARABIA IN ALL FIELDS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT HE IS WILLING TO BE A SAUDI STOOGE OR A TOADY. UNTIL SUCH TIME AS HE IS CONVINCED TO KEEP OPEN HIS LINES TO THE LEFT AND PARTICULARLY TO THE SOVIETS BOTH AS A WAY OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE SAUDIS AS WELL AS OF PROTECTING  
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HIS LEFT FLANK FROM ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES AT A TIME WHEN HE PERCEIVES THE GREATER DANGER COMES TO HIM FROM THE RIGHT.

13. AL-HAMDI IS NOT PERFECT BUT FOR THE SAUDIS AND FOR US AT THE PRESENT TIME HE WITH HIS PRAGMATISM AND MODERATION AS WELL AS HIS TECHNOCRATIC AND WESTERN-EDUCATED SUPPORTERS IS THE BEST WE CAN DISCERN ON A POLITICAL LANDSCAPE WHICH LIKE THE COMPLICATED GEOLOGICAL FEATURES OF THIS COUNTRY DOES NOT ALWAYS LEND ITSELF TO FACILE ANALYSIS AND COMPREHENSION.  
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